Tutorials
Week 5
Erasmus Universiteit · Int. Economics and Business Economics
Y1 - Int. to Behavioural EconomicsInhoud
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- Q1. The following table gives the payoffs in a prisoners’ dilemma. You have seen this game in previous courses and we wi
- Q2. Suppose the prisoners know that they will be separated and interrogated before they get arrested. Could you think of
- Q3. What is a major difference between these games and the game we played in the experiment?
- Q4. What is the difference between the following game and the previous two games?
- Q5.What is an important difference between the three previous games and the game we played in the experiment?
- Q6.Consider an ultimatum game where the players are fully anonymous. Assume that the players only play strategies that t
- Q7. Can you think of a variant of the Ultimatum Game in which you can test altruism?
- Q8.Can you think of a way in which you can change the instructions of the Ultimatum Game to make proposals closer to the
- Q9. Can you think of a way in which you can make Dictator Game giving closer to the Nash Equilibrium?
- Q10. In general, do males or females give higher offers in the Ultimatum Game?
- Q11. In general, do males or females attract higher offers in the Ultimatum Game?
- Q12.In general, do males or females give higher offers in the Dictator Game?
- Q13.In general, are students more or less likely to give 0, as compared to non-students?
- Q14.What is the name of the following game? How many Nash Equilibria do you think this game has?
- Q15.What is the name of the following game? How many Nash Equilibria does this game have? What is the main difference be
- Q16. What do you think of the following statements?
- Q17. Does the following game have a Nash Equilibrium?
- Q18. Is there a Nash Equilibrium in a game of ‘rock, paper, scissors’? If so, what is/are the strategy/strategies in the
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