Y1 - Microeconomics, Institutions and Welfare

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1. Chapter 4: Social interactions
2. 4.1: Social interactions: Game theory To simplify the model, we assume that:
3. 4.2: Equilibrium in the invisible hand game
4. 4.3: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
5. 4.4: Altruism
6. 4.5: Altruistic Preferences in the Prisoner’s dilemma
7. 4.6: Public goods, free riding and repeated interaction
8. 4.7: Public good contributions and peer punishment
9. 4.8: Behavioural experiments in the lab and in the field
10. 4.9: Cooperation, negotiation, conflicts of interest and social norms
11. 4.10: Dividing a pie (or leaving it on the table)
12. 4.11: Fair farmers, self-interested students?
13. 4.12: Competition in the ultimatum game
14. 4.13: Social interactions: Conflicts in the choice among Nash equilibria
15. Chapter 5: Property and Power: Mutual Gains and Conflict
16. 5.1: Institutions and power
17. 5.2: Evaluating institutions and outcomes: The Pareto - criterion
18. 5.3: Evaluating institutions and outcomes: Fairness
19. 5.4: A Model of choice and Conflict
20. 5.5: Technically feasible allocations
21. 5.6: Allocations imposed by force
22. 5.7: Economically feasible allocations and the surplus
23. 5.8: The Pareto efficiency curve and the distribution of the surplus
24. 5.9: Politics: Sharing the surplus
25. 5.10: Bargaining to a Pareto-efficient sharing of the surplus
26. 5.11: Angela and Bruno: The moral of the story
27. 5.12: Measuring economic inequality
28. 5.13: A policy to redistribute the surplus and raise efficiency